files

a-records.conf

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+# A Record
+     #local-data: "somecomputer.local. A 192.168.1.1"
+
+# PTR Record
+     #local-data-ptr: "192.168.1.1 somecomputer.local."

forward-records.conf

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+# Geen forward-zone sectie meer

srv-records.conf

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+# SRV records
+# _service._proto.name. | TTL | class | SRV | priority | weight | port | target.

unbound.conf

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+server:
+    ###########################################################################
+    # BASIC SETTINGS
+    ###########################################################################
+    # Time to live maximum for RRsets and messages in the cache. If the maximum
+    # kicks in, responses to clients still get decrementing TTLs based on the
+    # original (larger) values. When the internal TTL expires, the cache item
+    # has expired. Can be set lower to force the resolver to query for data
+    # often, and not trust (very large) TTL values.
+    cache-max-ttl: 86400
+
+    # Time to live minimum for RRsets and messages in the cache. If the minimum
+    # kicks in, the data is cached for longer than the domain owner intended,
+    # and thus less queries are made to look up the data. Zero makes sure the
+    # data in the cache is as the domain owner intended, higher values,
+    # especially more than an hour or so, can lead to trouble as the data in
+    # the cache does not match up with the actual data any more.
+    cache-min-ttl: 300
+
+    # Set the working directory for the program.
+    directory: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
+
+    # If enabled, Unbound will respond with Extended DNS Error codes (RFC 8914).
+    # These EDEs attach informative error messages to a response for various
+    # errors.
+    # When the val-log-level: option is also set to 2, responses with Extended
+    # DNS Errors concerning DNSSEC failures that are not served from cache, will
+    # also contain a descriptive text message about the reason for the failure.
+    ede: yes
+
+    # If enabled, Unbound will attach an Extended DNS Error (RFC 8914)
+    # Code 3 - Stale Answer as EDNS0 option to the expired response.
+    # This will not attach the EDE code without setting ede: yes as well.
+    ede-serve-expired: yes
+
+    # RFC 6891. Number  of bytes size to advertise as the EDNS reassembly buffer
+    # size. This is the value put into  datagrams over UDP towards peers.
+    # The actual buffer size is determined by msg-buffer-size (both for TCP and
+    # UDP). Do not set higher than that value.
+    # Default  is  1232 which is the DNS Flag Day 2020 recommendation.
+    # Setting to 512 bypasses even the most stringent path MTU problems, but
+    # is seen as extreme, since the amount of TCP fallback generated is
+    # excessive (probably also for this resolver, consider tuning the outgoing
+    # tcp number).
+    edns-buffer-size: 1232
+
+    # Listen to for queries from clients and answer from this network interface
+    # and port.
+    interface: 0.0.0.0@53
+
+    # Rotates RRSet order in response (the pseudo-random number is taken from
+    # the query ID, for speed and thread safety).
+    rrset-roundrobin: yes
+
+    # Drop user  privileges after  binding the port.
+    username: "_unbound"
+
+    ###########################################################################
+    # LOGGING
+    ###########################################################################
+
+    # Do not print log lines to inform about local zone actions
+    log-local-actions: no
+
+    # Do not print one line per query to the log
+    log-queries: no
+
+    # Do not print one line per reply to the log
+    log-replies: no
+
+    # Do not print log lines that say why queries return SERVFAIL to clients
+    log-servfail: no
+
+    # If you want to log to a file, use:
+    # logfile: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/unbound.log
+    # Set log location (using /dev/null further limits logging)
+    logfile: /dev/null
+
+    # Set logging level
+    # Level 0: No verbosity, only errors.
+    # Level 1: Gives operational information.
+    # Level 2: Gives detailed operational information including short information per query.
+    # Level 3: Gives query level information, output per query.
+    # Level 4:  Gives algorithm level information.
+    # Level 5: Logs client identification for cache misses.
+    verbosity: 0
+
+    ###########################################################################
+    # PRIVACY SETTINGS
+    ###########################################################################
+
+    # RFC 8198. Use the DNSSEC NSEC chain to synthesize NXDO-MAIN and other
+    # denials, using information from previous NXDO-MAINs answers. In other
+    # words, use cached NSEC records to generate negative answers within a
+    # range and positive answers from wildcards. This increases performance,
+    # decreases latency and resource utilization on both authoritative and
+    # recursive servers, and increases privacy. Also, it may help increase
+    # resilience to certain DoS attacks in some circumstances.
+    aggressive-nsec: yes
+
+    # Extra delay for timeouted UDP ports before they are closed, in msec.
+    # This prevents very delayed answer packets from the upstream (recursive)
+    # servers from bouncing against closed ports and setting off all sort of
+    # close-port counters, with eg. 1500 msec. When timeouts happen you need
+    # extra sockets, it checks the ID and remote IP of packets, and unwanted
+    # packets are added to the unwanted packet counter.
+    delay-close: 10000
+
+    # Prevent the unbound server from forking into the background as a daemon
+    do-daemonize: no
+
+    # Add localhost to the do-not-query-address list.
+    do-not-query-localhost: no
+
+    # Number  of  bytes size of the aggressive negative cache.
+    neg-cache-size: 4M
+
+    # Send minimum amount of information to upstream servers to enhance
+    # privacy (best privacy).
+    qname-minimisation: yes
+
+    ###########################################################################
+    # SECURITY SETTINGS
+    ###########################################################################
+    # Only give access to recursion clients from LAN IPs
+    access-control: 127.0.0.1/32 allow
+    access-control: 192.168.0.0/16 allow
+    access-control: 172.16.0.0/12 allow
+    access-control: 10.0.0.0/8 allow
+    # access-control: fc00::/7 allow
+    # access-control: ::1/128 allow
+
+    # File with trust anchor for  one  zone, which is tracked with RFC5011
+    # probes.
+    auto-trust-anchor-file: "var/root.key"
+
+    # Enable chroot (i.e, change apparent root directory for the current
+    # running process and its children)
+    chroot: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
+
+    # Deny queries of type ANY with an empty response.
+    deny-any: yes
+
+    # Harden against algorithm downgrade when multiple algorithms are
+    # advertised in the DS record.
+    harden-algo-downgrade: yes
+
+    # Harden against unknown records in the authority section and additional
+    # section. If no, such records are copied from the upstream and presented
+    # to the client together with the answer. If yes, it could hamper future
+    # protocol developments that want to add records.
+    harden-unknown-additional: yes
+
+    # RFC 8020. returns nxdomain to queries for a name below another name that
+    # is already known to be nxdomain.
+    harden-below-nxdomain: yes
+
+    # Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the
+    # zone becomes bogus. If turned off you run the risk of a downgrade attack
+    # that disables security for a zone.
+    harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
+
+    # Only trust glue if it is within the servers authority.
+    harden-glue: yes
+
+    # Ignore very large queries.
+    harden-large-queries: yes
+
+    # Perform additional queries for infrastructure data to harden the referral
+    # path. Validates the replies if trust anchors are configured and the zones
+    # are signed. This enforces DNSSEC validation on nameserver NS sets and the
+    # nameserver addresses that are encountered on the referral path to the
+    # answer. Experimental option.
+    harden-referral-path: no
+
+    # Ignore very small EDNS buffer sizes from queries.
+    harden-short-bufsize: yes
+
+    # If enabled the HTTP header User-Agent is not set. Use with caution
+    # as some webserver configurations may reject HTTP requests lacking
+    # this header. If needed, it is better to explicitly set the
+    # the http-user-agent.
+    hide-http-user-agent: no
+
+    # Refuse id.server and hostname.bind queries
+    hide-identity: yes
+
+    # Refuse version.server and version.bind queries
+    hide-version: yes
+
+    # Set the HTTP User-Agent header for outgoing HTTP requests. If
+    # set to "", the default, then the package name and version are
+    # used.
+    http-user-agent: "DNS"
+
+    # Report this identity rather than the hostname of the server.
+    identity: "DNS"
+
+    # These private network addresses are not allowed to be returned for public
+    # internet names. Any  occurrence of such addresses are removed from DNS
+    # answers. Additionally, the DNSSEC validator may mark the  answers  bogus.
+    # This  protects  against DNS  Rebinding
+    private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
+    private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
+    private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
+    private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
+    # private-address: fd00::/8
+    # private-address: fe80::/10
+    # private-address: ::ffff:0:0/96
+
+    # Enable ratelimiting of queries (per second) sent to nameserver for
+    # performing recursion. More queries are turned away with an error
+    # (servfail). This stops recursive floods (e.g., random query names), but
+    # not spoofed reflection floods. Cached responses are not rate limited by
+    # this setting. Experimental option.
+    ratelimit: 1000
+
+    # Use this certificate bundle for authenticating connections made to
+    # outside peers (e.g., auth-zone urls, DNS over TLS connections).
+    tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
+
+    # Set the total number of unwanted replies to eep track of in every thread.
+    # When it reaches the threshold, a defensive action of clearing the rrset
+    # and message caches is taken, hopefully flushing away any poison.
+    # Unbound suggests a value of 10 million.
+    unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000
+
+    # Use 0x20-encoded random bits in the query to foil spoof attempts. This
+    # perturbs the lowercase and uppercase of query names sent to authority
+    # servers and checks if the reply still has the correct casing.
+    # This feature is an experimental implementation of draft dns-0x20.
+    # Experimental option.
+    use-caps-for-id: yes
+
+    # Help protect users that rely on this validator for authentication from
+    # potentially bad data in the additional section. Instruct the validator to
+    # remove data from the additional section of secure messages that are not
+    # signed properly. Messages that are insecure, bogus, indeterminate or
+    # unchecked are not affected.
+    val-clean-additional: yes
+
+    ###########################################################################
+    # PERFORMANCE SETTINGS
+    ###########################################################################
+    # https://nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/howto-optimise/
+    # https://nlnetlabs.nl/news/2019/Feb/05/unbound-1.9.0-released/
+
+    # Number of slabs in the infrastructure cache. Slabs reduce lock contention
+    # by threads. Must be set to a power of 2.
+    infra-cache-slabs: 4
+
+    # Number of incoming TCP buffers to allocate per thread. Default
+    # is 10. If set to 0, or if do-tcp is "no", no  TCP  queries  from
+    # clients  are  accepted. For larger installations increasing this
+    # value is a good idea.
+    incoming-num-tcp: 10
+
+    # Number of slabs in the key cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
+    # threads. Must be set to a power of 2. Setting (close) to the number
+    # of cpus is a reasonable guess.
+    key-cache-slabs: 4
+
+    # Number  of  bytes  size  of  the  message  cache.
+    # Unbound recommendation is to Use roughly twice as much rrset cache memory
+    # as you use msg cache memory.
+    msg-cache-size: 474047829
+
+    # Number of slabs in the message cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
+    # threads. Must be set to a power of 2. Setting (close) to the number of
+    # cpus is a reasonable guess.
+    msg-cache-slabs: 4
+
+    # The number of queries that every thread will service simultaneously. If
+    # more queries arrive that need servicing, and no queries can be jostled
+    # out (see jostle-timeout), then the queries are dropped.
+    # This is best set at half the number of the outgoing-range.
+    # This Unbound instance was compiled with libevent so it can efficiently
+    # use more than 1024 file descriptors.
+    num-queries-per-thread: 4096
+
+    # The number of threads to create to serve clients.
+    # This is set dynamically at run time to effectively use available CPUs
+    # resources
+    num-threads: 3
+
+    # Number of ports to open. This number of file descriptors can be opened
+    # per thread.
+    # This Unbound instance was compiled with libevent so it can efficiently
+    # use more than 1024 file descriptors.
+    outgoing-range: 8192
+
+    # Number of bytes size of the RRset cache.
+    # Use roughly twice as much rrset cache memory as msg cache memory
+    rrset-cache-size: 948095658
+
+    # Number of slabs in the RRset cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
+    # threads. Must be set to a power of 2.
+    rrset-cache-slabs: 4
+
+    # Do no insert authority/additional sections into response messages when
+    # those sections are not required. This reduces response size
+    # significantly, and may avoid TCP fallback for some responses. This may
+    # cause a slight speedup.
+    minimal-responses: yes
+
+    # # Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record
+    # is encountered. This lowers the latency of requests at the expense of
+    # little more CPU usage.
+    prefetch: yes
+
+    # Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record is
+    # encountered. This lowers the latency of requests at the expense of little
+    # more CPU usage.
+    prefetch-key: yes
+
+    # Have unbound attempt to serve old responses from cache with a TTL of 0 in
+    # the response without waiting for the actual resolution to finish. The
+    # actual resolution answer ends up in the cache later on.
+    serve-expired: yes
+
+    # UDP queries that have waited in the socket buffer for a long time can be
+    # dropped. The time is set in seconds, 3 could be a good value to ignore old
+    # queries that likely the client does not need a reply for any more. This 
+    # could happen if the host has not been able to service the queries for a 
+    # while, i.e. Unbound is not running, and then is enabled again. It uses 
+    # timestamp socket options.
+    sock-queue-timeout: 3
+
+    # Open dedicated listening sockets for incoming queries for each thread and
+    # try to set the SO_REUSEPORT socket option on each socket. May distribute
+    # incoming queries to threads more evenly.
+    so-reuseport: yes
+
+    ###########################################################################
+    # LOCAL ZONE
+    ###########################################################################
+
+    # Include file for local-data and local-data-ptr
+    include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/a-records.conf
+    include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/srv-records.conf
+
+    ###########################################################################
+    # FORWARD ZONE
+    ###########################################################################
+
+    include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/forward-records.conf
+
+
+# Remote control config section.
+remote-control:
+	# Enable remote control with unbound-control(8) here.
+	# set up the keys and certificates with unbound-control-setup.
+	control-enable: no
+
+	# what interfaces are listened to for remote control.
+	# give 0.0.0.0 and ::0 to listen to all interfaces.
+	# set to an absolute path to use a unix local name pipe, certificates
+	# are not used for that, so key and cert files need not be present.
+	control-interface: 0.0.0.0
+	# control-interface: ::1
+
+	# for localhost, you can disable use of TLS by setting this to "no"
+	# For local sockets this option is ignored, and TLS is not used.
+	control-use-cert: no